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Restricting the
Environmental
Protection
Agency:
Expanding
Judicial
Review
by Myriam Marquez Langley
The Clean Air Act of 1970 § 112
(b)(1)(B) authorizes the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency to
regulate "emission standards" for hazar
dous air pollutants "at the level which in
his judgment provides an ample margin of
safety to protect public health."' The
emission of an air pollutant in violation of
an applicable "emission standard" is
prohibited by § 112(c)(1)(B), and its vio-
lators are subject to a fine and/or im-
prisonment under § 113(c)(1)(C).
42 U.S.C. 1857
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Accordingly, the EPA Administrator
issued a "National Standard For
Asbestos" regulation which specifies a
certain procedure or "work practice" to
be followed in demolition of buildings
containing asbestos.2 The regulation re-
quires the owner or operator of a demoli-
tion operation to wet and remove any fria-
ble asbestos materials before wrecking is
commenced.
On February 19, 1974, Adamo Wreck-
ing Company failed to wet and remove
friable asbestos material from a commer-
cial building before demolition. Adamo
was indicted in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
for violation of an emission standard
under § 112(c)(1)(B). The District Court
granted Adamo's motion to dismiss on the
ground that no violation of § 112 (c)(1)(B)
[necessary to establish criminal liability
under § 113(c)(1)(C)] had been alleged.
The court held that, although the cited
regulation is captioned as an emission
standard, it is merely a procedure or work
1 40 CFR. 61 22(d)(2)( i)
practice and thus its violation is not sub-
ject to criminal proceedings.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the 6th Circuit reversed, citing § 307(b)
of the Clean Air Act. This section pro-
vides that a petition for review of the Ad-
ministrator's action in promulgating an
emission standard is to be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit and that
judicial review of such action is not per-
missible in a civil or criminal enforcement
proceeding.3 The court held that in-
asmuch as Adamo's appeal arose from a
criminal proceeding, § 307(b) precluded
him from questioning whether a regula-
tion ostensibly promulgated by the Ad-
ministrator was in fact an "emission
standard."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
and on January 10, 1978, in a 5 to 4 deci-
sion, reversed the holding of the Court of
Appeals. Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White,
Marshall and Powell, delivered the opin-
ion of the Court and concluded that
because of the stringent penalty imposed
by Congress for the violation of an "emis-
sion standard," those standards are in-
tended to be "regulations of a certain
type." In addition, the majority concluded
that the Act did not empower the Admin-
istrator, "after the manner of Humpty
Dumpty in 'Through the Looking Glass'
to make a regulation an 'emission stand-
ard' by his mere designation." The Court
also held that, while the preclusive and
exclusivity provisions of § 307(b) of the
Act would prevent Adamo from obtaining
judicial review of an emission standard in
a criminal proceeding, he was nonetheless
entitled to claim that the regulation was
not an emission standard at all.
Justice Rehnquist looked to the
statutory scheme and language of the Act
545 F2d 1 (1976)
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and determined that an "emission stand-
ard" is intended to be a quantitative limit
on emissions, not a "work practice"
standard. Unfortunately, Justice Rehn-
quist disregarded the fact that asbestos
emissions are impossible to measure
quantitatively. The history of the regula-
tion demonstrates that the work practice
standard was chosen by the Administrator
after it became clear that he could not
prohibit all visible emissions of asbestos
without destroying an entire industry.
Furthermore, while numerical standards
are preferred by Congress, the statute
contains no express requirement that
standards always be framed in numerical
terms; nor has Congress expressed an
overriding interest in using such terms
when a less drastic control technique is
available.
The majority also relied on the rule that
"where there is ambiguity in a criminal
statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the
defendant." United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336,348 (1971). But in Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S.1,16, (1965) the Court
held that "[w]hen faced with a problem of
statutory construction, this Court shows
great deference to the interpretation given
the statute by the officers or agency
charged with its administration. 'To sus-
tain the application of the statutory term
[as applied by the agency], we need not
find that its construction is the only rea-
sonable one, or even that it is the result
we would have reached had the question
arisen in the first instance in judicial pto-
ceedings.' "
Looking again to the statutory scheme,
Justice Rehnquist believed that the
Government was not relieved of its duty
to prove that the allegedly violated
regulation is an "emission standard" even
though § 307(b)(2) precludes judicial
review of the validity of emission stand-
ards. Under §307(b)(1), though, this
regulation could have been reviewed only
in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, and because of this express
language, Adamo should have been bar-
red from raising the issue before any other
court.
The majority distinguishes Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944),
where the Court held that in the context
of criminal proceedings, Congress has the
power to require that the validity of a
regulatory action be challenged in a par-
ticular court at a particular time, or not at
all. However, Justice Rehnquist views the
statutory provisions of the Emergency
Price Control Act considered under Yakus
as a "relatively simple statutory scheme"
in contrast with the Clean Air Act's "far
more complex inter-relationships between
the imposition of criminal sanctions and
judicial review of the Administrator's ac-
tions." There is nothing ambiguous,
vague or difficult in § 307(b). Its intent
that a petition for review of an action of
the Administrator in promulgating any
emission standard may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit could hardly
be more obvious. Congress has clearly ex-
pressed that "any review of such actions"
be controlled by the provisions of §
307(b) .4 Additionally, the Adamo opinion
fails to adequately express the alleged ine-
quities which would arise as a result of
adherence to the Act's venue require-
ments in the current "complex" situation.
The majority's interpretation of an
"emission standard" denies the Adminis-
trator the authority to effectively regulate
the emission of asbestos, a poisonous sub-
stance which poses an especially grave
threat to human health. Their interpreta-
tion of the plain statutory language of §
307(b) frustrates the intent of Congress to
establish a unified and expedient system
of judicial review under the Clean Air Act.
In the words of Justice Stewart, who dis-
sented along with Justices Brennan,
Blackmun and Stevens, "the Court today
has allowed the camel's nose into the tent,
and I fear that the rest of the camel is
almost certain to follow."
'S. Rep. No. 91-1196, p.41 (1970)
The Rights
and
Responsibility
of Paternity
by Roxane Nass Sokolove
On January 10, 1978, the Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that
an unwed father's substantive due process
rights were not violated by a Georgia
statute which denied him the authority to
prevent the adoption of his illegitimate
child. Nor was the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment violated
by the distinction made in the Georgia
statute between the rights of fathers of
legitimate children and the rights of
fathers of illegitimate children.
Although the unwed father may have as
great a personal interest in his child as a
married father has in his child, the unwed
father must establish that interest in law
by either marrying the mother of his
children and recognizing the offspring of
the illicit relationship, or legitimizing the
children as provided by statute. The
authority to then bar the adoption of the
children stems from this legally estab-
lished interest.
In Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S. Ct. 549
(1978), therefore, the absence of such
legal status, and the Court's application of
the "best interests of the child" standard
and recognition of the state's interest in
child rearing by a family unit were the
vehicles used to defeat the asserted con-
stitutional rights of an unwed father.
In December, 1964, a child was born
from the illicit relationship of Ardell
Williams, appellee, and Leon Webster
Quilloin, appellant. The child's mother
and natural father never married nor lived
together as a family. In September, 1967,
Ardell Williams married Randall Walcott,
appellee. The following March, Randall
Walcott, with the consent of the child's
mother, filed a petition to adopt the child.
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